Contending, by analyzing founding-era statements (official and unofficial), the Federalist Papers, and ratification debates, that the Article V “Convention for proposing Amendments” was understood as being a convention of the states. Concluding further that Article V imported the standardized practices and procedures of a founding-era general interstate “convention,” understood in colonial America as analogous to a “congress.”
Documenting that a “convention” was understood to be a political assembly, distinct from a legislature, which undertook a prescribed governmental function. Arguing that the Founders modeled the Article V “Convention for proposing Amendments” after the universal model that existed in colonial America and was intended to be a forum for states to assemble on equal footing to deliberate, with considerable discretion as to the procedure, on the subject matter to which the convention had been limited.
Arguing that, in calling for a constitutional convention, states may limit the convention to a specific subject matter or even to a specific amendment. Arguing that founding-era dictionaries’ and other places in the Constitution’s usage of “propose” does not mandate that the convention have discretionary power to propose additional amendments. Contending that, instead, conventions have the power to decide whether to propose the amendments to which the convention has been limited.
Documenting based on Founding-era dictionaries that “application” of state legislatures as used in Article V refers to state legislatures addressing Congress and requesting a convention. Concluding further, based on Founding-era practice, conventions, and documents, that the state legislatures are not limited by what subject matter their applications concern but that they may limit the scope of the agenda of the conventions that they initiate.
Arguing based on the text and history of Article V that the States have the power to limit the scope of the convention to certain topics and that the States’ applications to Congress should be grouped and counted by subject-matter. Further suggesting that although the text is unclear as to how the rules and procedures of a convention ought to be conducted, the most faithful approach is that the convention be allowed to adopt its own procedures in accordance with the Philadelphia Convention of 1878.
Arguing that the option included in Article V to amend the Constitution by a convention of the states was understood as a safeguard against bare popular sovereignty and a check on the power of the new national government, despite the federalist preference for leaving constitutional amendment to Congress–an existing institution of government–and fears about constitutional instability.
Making reference to the Federalist Papers and the history of the adoption of Article V’s final draft text to argue that the purpose of the state convention clause was to give the states the exact same power of amendment introduction as possessed by Congress. Concluding that the clause allows for a limited convention.
Suggesting based on an examination of the original drafts of Article V and the themes of the Philadelphia convention that state-called conventions can be both unlimited and limited.
Concluding based on the history of the ratification debates that the convention method of proposing amendments was formed over objection from the federalists to safeguard against the oppression of the states by the national government. Conceding that Article V does not address the form, quorum, and procedural matters that may arise if such a convention of the states is called.
Arguing that the text and context of the convention clause suggests that the states’ “application” to the Congress must include plenary deliberation on the whole problem and not merely a convention to consider an already formulated amendment.